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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 23:23:56 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-47699 — Confidential Containers Guest Components image-rs: zip-slip-class arbitrary file write via absolute entry path in hardl…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47699</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; confidential-containers guest-components&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Confidential Containers Guest Components provides guest tools and components for confidential container workloads. From 0.16.0 until 0.20.0, a crafted OCI image layer can make image_rs::stream::unpack::unpack() create a hardlink outside its destination directory. In image-rs/src/stream/unpack.rs, try_hardlink_fallback() validates the hardlink source but computes the destination with destination.join(&amp;amp;entry_rel). Rust Path::join replaces the base when entry_rel is an absolute tar entry path, so fs::hard_link(&amp;amp;src_canon, &amp;amp;dst_entry_abs) can write attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary absolute path. In Confidential Containers the workload owner already controls trusted image content, so the issue is a workload-owner escape into the pod virtual machine rather than a crossing of the image trust boundary, but it may enable access to pod virtual machine capabilities and attestation abuse. This issue is fixed in version 0.20.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; confidential-containers guest-components&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Confidential Containers Guest Components provides guest tools and components for confidential container workloads. From 0.16.0 until 0.20.0, a crafted OCI image layer can make image_rs::stream::unpack::unpack() create a hardlink outside its destination directory. In image-rs/src/stream/unpack.rs, try_hardlink_fallback() validates the hardlink source but computes the destination with destination.join(&amp;amp;entry_rel). Rust Path::join replaces the base when entry_rel is an absolute tar entry path, so fs::hard_link(&amp;amp;src_canon, &amp;amp;dst_entry_abs) can write attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary absolute path. In Confidential Containers the workload owner already controls trusted image content, so the issue is a workload-owner escape into the pod virtual machine rather than a crossing of the image trust boundary, but it may enable access to pod virtual machine capabilities and attestation abuse. This issue is fixed in version 0.20.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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