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      <title>CVE-2026-69183 — Monkeytype: Rate-limit and anti-brute-force controls bypassable via spoofed HTTP headers (forgotPasswordEmail/verificat…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-69183</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; monkeytypegame monkeytype&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Monkeytype is a minimalistic and customizable typing test. In 26.26.0 and earlier, the backend rate-limit key generator in backend/src/middlewares/rate-limit.ts uses client-controlled cf-connecting-ip and x-forwarded-for headers before the trust-proxy-derived req.ip value. An unauthenticated attacker can rotate either header to create a new bucket for each request, bypassing rootRateLimiter, badAuthRateLimiter, getKey(), and the getKeyWithUid() fallback used by public endpoints. This permits repeated POST /users/forgotPasswordEmail and verificationEmail requests, mail bombing registered users, consuming Firebase or SMTP quota, evading brute-force protection, and enabling resource exhaustion. Exploitability of cf-connecting-ip depends on deployment topology, but x-forwarded-for and direct-to-origin paths remain affected when those values are not overwritten by a trusted proxy. No fixed version is available as of this review.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; monkeytypegame monkeytype&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Monkeytype is a minimalistic and customizable typing test. In 26.26.0 and earlier, the backend rate-limit key generator in backend/src/middlewares/rate-limit.ts uses client-controlled cf-connecting-ip and x-forwarded-for headers before the trust-proxy-derived req.ip value. An unauthenticated attacker can rotate either header to create a new bucket for each request, bypassing rootRateLimiter, badAuthRateLimiter, getKey(), and the getKeyWithUid() fallback used by public endpoints. This permits repeated POST /users/forgotPasswordEmail and verificationEmail requests, mail bombing registered users, consuming Firebase or SMTP quota, evading brute-force protection, and enabling resource exhaustion. Exploitability of cf-connecting-ip depends on deployment topology, but x-forwarded-for and direct-to-origin paths remain affected when those values are not overwritten by a trusted proxy. No fixed version is available as of this review.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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