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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-71492 — Banks: Path traversal in `DirectoryPromptRegistry.set()` allows arbitrary file write outside the registry root</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-71492</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; masci banks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Banks generates meaningful LLM prompts using a simple template language. Prior to version 2.4.5, DirectoryPromptRegistry.set() in src/banks/registries/directory.py interpolates attacker-controlled Prompt.name and Prompt.version values into a Path without canonicalization or containment validation. Relative traversal such as ../victim/foo and an absolute Prompt.name can escape or discard the configured registry root, while overwrite=True permits replacement of existing target files. The poisoned name is persisted in index.json and reconstructed by _load(), allowing the out-of-root path to survive later registry loads. An application that forwards request data into these fields can therefore write Prompt.raw bytes to attacker-chosen paths writable by the application process. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; masci banks&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Banks generates meaningful LLM prompts using a simple template language. Prior to version 2.4.5, DirectoryPromptRegistry.set() in src/banks/registries/directory.py interpolates attacker-controlled Prompt.name and Prompt.version values into a Path without canonicalization or containment validation. Relative traversal such as ../victim/foo and an absolute Prompt.name can escape or discard the configured registry root, while overwrite=True permits replacement of existing target files. The poisoned name is persisted in index.json and reconstructed by _load(), allowing the out-of-root path to survive later registry loads. An application that forwards request data into these fields can therefore write Prompt.raw bytes to attacker-chosen paths writable by the application process. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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