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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 16:01:25 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-52739 — ZEBRA: Repeated Non-Finalized Shielded Transaction Aborts Zebra Before Duplicate-Nullifier Rejection</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-52739</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ZcashFoundation zebra, ZcashFoundation zebra-state&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a malicious block producer can terminate zebrad by placing the same shielded transaction in a non-finalized parent block and its child. In zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rs, Chain::push originally inserted the transaction hash into tx_loc_by_hash and asserted uniqueness before updating shielded data and running the duplicate Sprout, Sapling, or Orchard nullifier checks. The repeated transaction therefore reached the transactions must be unique within a single chain assertion before contextual validation could reject it cleanly. Zebra release builds use panic equals abort, so the reachable assertion terminates the entire process; exploitation requires either two consecutive attacker-mined blocks or an attacker-mined child immediately after an honest block includes the attacker&amp;#39;s shielded transaction. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ZcashFoundation zebra, ZcashFoundation zebra-state&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a malicious block producer can terminate zebrad by placing the same shielded transaction in a non-finalized parent block and its child. In zebra-state/src/service/non_finalized_state/chain.rs, Chain::push originally inserted the transaction hash into tx_loc_by_hash and asserted uniqueness before updating shielded data and running the duplicate Sprout, Sapling, or Orchard nullifier checks. The repeated transaction therefore reached the transactions must be unique within a single chain assertion before contextual validation could reject it cleanly. Zebra release builds use panic equals abort, so the reachable assertion terminates the entire process; exploitation requires either two consecutive attacker-mined blocks or an attacker-mined child immediately after an honest block includes the attacker&amp;#39;s shielded transaction. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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