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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 05 Oct 2026 15:57:53 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-68433 — libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-68433</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;handle_get_version_reply() uses msg-&amp;gt;front_alloc_len as the decode
boundary for MON_GET_VERSION_REPLY.  That is the size of the reused
reply buffer, not the number of bytes actually received.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A truncated reply can therefore pass ceph_decode_need() and decode the
second u64 from stale tail bytes left in the buffer by an earlier
message, causing an uninitialized memory read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use msg-&amp;gt;front.iov_len as the receive-side decode boundary, matching
other libceph reply handlers and limiting decoding to the bytes that
were actually read from the wire.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;handle_get_version_reply() uses msg-&amp;gt;front_alloc_len as the decode
boundary for MON_GET_VERSION_REPLY.  That is the size of the reused
reply buffer, not the number of bytes actually received.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A truncated reply can therefore pass ceph_decode_need() and decode the
second u64 from stale tail bytes left in the buffer by an earlier
message, causing an uninitialized memory read.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use msg-&amp;gt;front.iov_len as the receive-side decode boundary, matching
other libceph reply handlers and limiting decoding to the bytes that
were actually read from the wire.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-68433</guid>
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