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      <title>CVE-2026-68922 — MobSF: Arbitrary File Read via Path Traversal in ZIP Uploads</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-68922</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MobSF Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MobSF is a mobile application security testing tool used. Prior to 4.5.1, find_icon_path_zip in mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/icon_analysis.py uses the Android manifest android:icon value to construct paths under the scan resource directory without rejecting traversal or verifying containment, allowing an authenticated user to upload a crafted ZIP or APK that reads a server file with an ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS suffix, copies it to DWD_DIR as the predictable name -icon., and retrieves it through the /download/ endpoint. The same behavior provides a file-existence oracle through the icon_path report field. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MobSF Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;MobSF is a mobile application security testing tool used. Prior to 4.5.1, find_icon_path_zip in mobsf/StaticAnalyzer/views/android/icon_analysis.py uses the Android manifest android:icon value to construct paths under the scan resource directory without rejecting traversal or verifying containment, allowing an authenticated user to upload a crafted ZIP or APK that reads a server file with an ALLOWED_EXTENSIONS suffix, copies it to DWD_DIR as the predictable name -icon., and retrieves it through the /download/ endpoint. The same behavior provides a file-existence oracle through the icon_path report field. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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