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      <title>CVE-2026-55165 — Lemur : JWT verifier trusts attacker-supplied alg from token header — defense-in-depth gap; chain-dependent ATO with se…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-55165</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Netflix lemur&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Lemur manages TLS certificate creation. Prior to 1.9.2, the JWT verifier in lemur/auth/service.py:130-137 used fetch_token_header to read header_data[&amp;#34;alg&amp;#34;] from an unverified token and passed that attacker-controlled value to decode_with_multiple_secrets. PyJWT 2.x rejects alg=none with the configured key, so the flaw is a defense-in-depth gap rather than a direct authentication bypass in the shipped configuration. The unpinned algorithm can become exploitable after an asymmetric-signing migration through algorithm confusion, and it weakens algorithm-based anomaly detection because the token chooses the recorded value. A separate disclosure of LEMUR_TOKEN_SECRET would also permit forged HS256 tokens, although that disclosure is an independent prerequisite. The fix introduces the server-controlled LEMUR_TOKEN_ALGORITHMS allowlist and defaults it to HS256. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.2.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Netflix lemur&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Lemur manages TLS certificate creation. Prior to 1.9.2, the JWT verifier in lemur/auth/service.py:130-137 used fetch_token_header to read header_data[&amp;#34;alg&amp;#34;] from an unverified token and passed that attacker-controlled value to decode_with_multiple_secrets. PyJWT 2.x rejects alg=none with the configured key, so the flaw is a defense-in-depth gap rather than a direct authentication bypass in the shipped configuration. The unpinned algorithm can become exploitable after an asymmetric-signing migration through algorithm confusion, and it weakens algorithm-based anomaly detection because the token chooses the recorded value. A separate disclosure of LEMUR_TOKEN_SECRET would also permit forged HS256 tokens, although that disclosure is an independent prerequisite. The fix introduces the server-controlled LEMUR_TOKEN_ALGORITHMS allowlist and defaults it to HS256. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.2.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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