<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 11:38:04 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-73649 — Velocity.js: Remote Code Execution via property-read to Function constructor (bypass of CVE-2026-44966 fix)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-73649</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; shepherdwind velocity.js&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Velocity.js is a JavaScript implementation of the Apache Velocity template engine. Prior to 2.1.7, the earlier fix for CVE-2026-44966 filtered constructor, __proto__, and prototype only in the #set assignment handler in src/compile/set.ts, while property-read expressions in src/compile/references.ts remained unfiltered. The getReferences() flow called getAttributes(), whose property access allowed an attacker-controlled template to traverse constructor.constructor to the JavaScript Function constructor. The #set handler validated only the assignment target and did not inspect the right-hand property-read expression, allowing arbitrary shell commands, environment-variable access, cloud-credential access, and internal-network access in the server process. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.7.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; shepherdwind velocity.js&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Velocity.js is a JavaScript implementation of the Apache Velocity template engine. Prior to 2.1.7, the earlier fix for CVE-2026-44966 filtered constructor, __proto__, and prototype only in the #set assignment handler in src/compile/set.ts, while property-read expressions in src/compile/references.ts remained unfiltered. The getReferences() flow called getAttributes(), whose property access allowed an attacker-controlled template to traverse constructor.constructor to the JavaScript Function constructor. The #set handler validated only the assignment target and did not inspect the right-hand property-read expression, allowing arbitrary shell commands, environment-variable access, cloud-credential access, and internal-network access in the server process. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.7.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-73649</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
