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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 14:42:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-73509 — OpenList: Authenticated users can rename files outside their base path via batch rename `src_name` traversal</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-73509</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenListTeam OpenList&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenList a file list program that supports multiple storage. Prior to 4.2.4, the authenticated /api/fs/batch_rename handler in server/handles/fsbatch.go authorizes only the source directory produced by user.JoinPath(req.SrcDir) and validates renameObject.NewName with checkRelativePath, but does not validate attacker-controlled renameObject.SrcName, supplied as src_name, before concatenating it with the authorized path and passing the result to fs.Rename. A user with rename permission can use traversal segments in src_name to make path normalization select a file outside the authorized directory and configured base path, resulting in cross-user file integrity loss, limited availability impact, and file-existence disclosure through success or error responses. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; OpenListTeam OpenList&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;OpenList a file list program that supports multiple storage. Prior to 4.2.4, the authenticated /api/fs/batch_rename handler in server/handles/fsbatch.go authorizes only the source directory produced by user.JoinPath(req.SrcDir) and validates renameObject.NewName with checkRelativePath, but does not validate attacker-controlled renameObject.SrcName, supplied as src_name, before concatenating it with the authorized path and passing the result to fs.Rename. A user with rename permission can use traversal segments in src_name to make path normalization select a file outside the authorized directory and configured base path, resulting in cross-user file integrity loss, limited availability impact, and file-existence disclosure through success or error responses. This issue is fixed in version 4.2.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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