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      <title>CVE-2026-52879 — Klever-Go: Unbounded goroutine spawn on direct-message ingress enables peer-driven DoS</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-52879</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; klever-io klever-go&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. In versions 1.7.14 through 1.7.17, the direct-message ingress handler spawns a new goroutine for every incoming direct message before the processor-level antiflood layer makes any admission decision, with no semaphore, throttler, or bound on the number of concurrent in-flight spawns. Because the antiflood check runs inside the spawned goroutine rather than before it, a single connected peer can open a direct-send stream and send a stream of well-formed messages to force unbounded goroutine creation, where each goroutine allocates its own stack and holds a message reference until processing completes, adding scheduler and garbage-collection pressure faster than the runtime can drain it. This lets one peer degrade the node&amp;#39;s availability and its ability to process legitimate traffic, resulting in a remotely triggerable denial of service. The issue is fixed in 1.7.18.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; klever-io klever-go&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Klever-Go is the Go implementation of the Klever blockchain protocol. In versions 1.7.14 through 1.7.17, the direct-message ingress handler spawns a new goroutine for every incoming direct message before the processor-level antiflood layer makes any admission decision, with no semaphore, throttler, or bound on the number of concurrent in-flight spawns. Because the antiflood check runs inside the spawned goroutine rather than before it, a single connected peer can open a direct-send stream and send a stream of well-formed messages to force unbounded goroutine creation, where each goroutine allocates its own stack and holds a message reference until processing completes, adding scheduler and garbage-collection pressure faster than the runtime can drain it. This lets one peer degrade the node&amp;#39;s availability and its ability to process legitimate traffic, resulting in a remotely triggerable denial of service. The issue is fixed in 1.7.18.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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