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      <title>CVE-2026-7693 — Backup Migration &lt;= 2.1.5.1 - Authenticated (Administrator+) OS Command Injection via 'file' Parameter</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-7693</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; inisev Backup Migration&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Backup Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to OS Command Injection in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5.1 due to insufficient sanitization of the `file` POST parameter on the `restoreBackup()` AJAX handler. The handler applies `esc_attr()` — an HTML-context sanitizer that does not strip shell metacharacters — and concatenates the result, unquoted, into a `php-cli -f … bmi_restore &amp;lt;file&amp;gt; &amp;lt;remote&amp;gt;` command passed to `exec()`. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access (or any user granted the plugin&amp;#39;s `do_backups` capability) and above, to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web-server user, bypassing WordPress hardening constants such as `DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT` and `DISALLOW_FILE_MODS` that would otherwise prevent code execution from the admin UI. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2023-7002, which patched the same pattern only in the `$_POST[&amp;#39;url&amp;#39;]` path of `handleQuickMigration()`; the equivalent mitigations (`rawurlencode()` + explicit shell-metachar replacement + double-quoting in `exec()`) were never applied to `$backupName`.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; inisev Backup Migration&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Backup Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to OS Command Injection in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5.1 due to insufficient sanitization of the `file` POST parameter on the `restoreBackup()` AJAX handler. The handler applies `esc_attr()` — an HTML-context sanitizer that does not strip shell metacharacters — and concatenates the result, unquoted, into a `php-cli -f … bmi_restore &amp;lt;file&amp;gt; &amp;lt;remote&amp;gt;` command passed to `exec()`. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access (or any user granted the plugin&amp;#39;s `do_backups` capability) and above, to execute arbitrary OS commands as the web-server user, bypassing WordPress hardening constants such as `DISALLOW_FILE_EDIT` and `DISALLOW_FILE_MODS` that would otherwise prevent code execution from the admin UI. This is an incomplete fix of CVE-2023-7002, which patched the same pattern only in the `$_POST[&amp;#39;url&amp;#39;]` path of `handleQuickMigration()`; the equivalent mitigations (`rawurlencode()` + explicit shell-metachar replacement + double-quoting in `exec()`) were never applied to `$backupName`.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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