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      <title>CVE-2026-66065 — Ouroboros: Untrusted project .env can still reach RCE via omitted execution-routing keys (Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-47…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-66065</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Q00 ouroboros&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ouroboros is a local-first runtime for AI coding agents that records their actions and applies user-defined policies to constrain behavior. Versions prior to 0.42.1 have an incomplete denylist. Several execution-routing keys of the same RCE class were omitted, so a malicious cloned repo can still reach arbitrary command execution by shipping a .env (auto-loaded at import, with no review step). The CVE-2026-47211 fix added _UNTRUSTED_ENV_DENYLIST to stop an untrusted project-directory .env from redirecting execution, but it did not account for all keys. The backend config-home and MCP/plugin roots bypass the approval gate by pointing the nested agent, MCP servers, and plugin roster at attacker config. Other variables re-enable blocked local transports, replace sub-agent prompts, switch backends, and lower tool approval classes, further weakening the approval gate. This issue has been fixed in version 0.42.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Q00 ouroboros&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Ouroboros is a local-first runtime for AI coding agents that records their actions and applies user-defined policies to constrain behavior. Versions prior to 0.42.1 have an incomplete denylist. Several execution-routing keys of the same RCE class were omitted, so a malicious cloned repo can still reach arbitrary command execution by shipping a .env (auto-loaded at import, with no review step). The CVE-2026-47211 fix added _UNTRUSTED_ENV_DENYLIST to stop an untrusted project-directory .env from redirecting execution, but it did not account for all keys. The backend config-home and MCP/plugin roots bypass the approval gate by pointing the nested agent, MCP servers, and plugin roster at attacker config. Other variables re-enable blocked local transports, replace sub-agent prompts, switch backends, and lower tool approval classes, further weakening the approval gate. This issue has been fixed in version 0.42.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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