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      <title>CVE-2026-54020 — Open WebUI: DNS Rebinding SSRF Bypass</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-54020</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.11.0, Open WebUI resolved a hostname during URL validation and rejected private, loopback, and link-local addresses, but the HTTP clients resolved the hostname again at connection time. An authenticated attacker who controlled authoritative DNS for a submitted hostname could answer with a public address during validation and an internal one during connection, reaching cloud metadata, loopback admin APIs, or internal services through URL ingest, chat image_url fetches, image editing, or OAuth profile-picture fetches, with most paths returning the response to the attacker and the OAuth path forwarding the OAuth access token. This issue is fixed in 0.11.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; open-webui&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.11.0, Open WebUI resolved a hostname during URL validation and rejected private, loopback, and link-local addresses, but the HTTP clients resolved the hostname again at connection time. An authenticated attacker who controlled authoritative DNS for a submitted hostname could answer with a public address during validation and an internal one during connection, reaching cloud metadata, loopback admin APIs, or internal services through URL ingest, chat image_url fetches, image editing, or OAuth profile-picture fetches, with most paths returning the response to the attacker and the OAuth path forwarding the OAuth access token. This issue is fixed in 0.11.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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