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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-66402 — FreeRDP before 3.29.0 TLS Certificate Identity Validation Bypass</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-66402</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; FreeRDP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FreeRDP before 3.29.0 (affected versions &amp;lt;= 3.28.0) contains multiple TLS certificate identity validation weaknesses in tls_verify_certificate(), tls_match_hostname(), and x509_utils_get_dns_names(). Because FreeRDP performs custom Common Name and DNS SAN string matching instead of using OpenSSL&amp;#39;s length-aware identity validation APIs, it (1) truncates DNS SAN values at embedded NUL bytes (accepting e.g. &amp;#39;victim.example\0.attacker.example&amp;#39; as &amp;#39;victim.example&amp;#39;), (2) accepts a matching Common Name even when non-matching DNS SAN entries are present, and (3) accepts IP-literal targets via DNS/CN matching without comparing iPAddress SANs. Under a trusted or misissued certificate chain, an attacker positioned to present such a certificate can bypass server identity verification, weakening TLS server authentication.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; FreeRDP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;FreeRDP before 3.29.0 (affected versions &amp;lt;= 3.28.0) contains multiple TLS certificate identity validation weaknesses in tls_verify_certificate(), tls_match_hostname(), and x509_utils_get_dns_names(). Because FreeRDP performs custom Common Name and DNS SAN string matching instead of using OpenSSL&amp;#39;s length-aware identity validation APIs, it (1) truncates DNS SAN values at embedded NUL bytes (accepting e.g. &amp;#39;victim.example\0.attacker.example&amp;#39; as &amp;#39;victim.example&amp;#39;), (2) accepts a matching Common Name even when non-matching DNS SAN entries are present, and (3) accepts IP-literal targets via DNS/CN matching without comparing iPAddress SANs. Under a trusted or misissued certificate chain, an attacker positioned to present such a certificate can bypass server identity verification, weakening TLS server authentication.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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