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      <title>CVE-2026-45321 — Malware in 42 @tanstack/* packages exfiltrates cloud credentials, GitHub tokens, and SSH keys</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45321</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; @tanstack arktype-adapter, @tanstack eslint-plugin-router, @tanstack eslint-plugin-start, @tanstack history, @tanstack nitro-v2-vite-plugin, @tanstack react-router, @tanstack react-router-devtools, @tanstack react-router-ssr-query, @tanstack react-start, @tanstack react-start-client and 32 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a pull_request_target &amp;#34;Pwn Request&amp;#34; misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process — to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity. Each affected package received exactly two malicious versions, published a few minutes apart.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; @tanstack arktype-adapter, @tanstack eslint-plugin-router, @tanstack eslint-plugin-start, @tanstack history, @tanstack nitro-v2-vite-plugin, @tanstack react-router, @tanstack react-router-devtools, @tanstack react-router-ssr-query, @tanstack react-start, @tanstack react-start-client and 32 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On 2026-05-11, between approximately 19:20 and 19:26 UTC, 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages were published to the npm registry. The publishes were authenticated via the legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding for TanStack/router, but the publish workflow itself was not modified. The attacker chained three known vulnerability classes — a pull_request_target &amp;#34;Pwn Request&amp;#34; misconfiguration, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and runtime memory extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process — to publish credential-stealing malware under a trusted identity. Each affected package received exactly two malicious versions, published a few minutes apart.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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