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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-47724 — nebula-mesh: API endpoints lack ownership checks, enabling cross-operator privilege escalation</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47724</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; juev nebula-mesh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.4, the `/api/v1/*` route surface trusts the bearer token alone for authorisation on most endpoints. The codebase itself admits this at `internal/api/hosts.go:384`: &amp;#34;API trusts the bearer token for authorisation; per-CA ownership is enforced only in the Web layer.&amp;#34; The Web UI gates state-changing routes through `loadAccessibleCA` (`internal/web/cas.go`); CA-management endpoints in `internal/api/cas.go` ALSO have proper `canAccessCA` gates. The gap is on the host, network, firewall, mobile-bundle, and most operator endpoints. Combined with the per-operator CA model from ADR 0002, this gives any non-admin operator API key broad cross-tenant access — instant privilege escalation in the worst case. Version 0.3.4 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; juev nebula-mesh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control plane for Slack Nebula mesh virtual private network. Prior to version 0.3.4, the `/api/v1/*` route surface trusts the bearer token alone for authorisation on most endpoints. The codebase itself admits this at `internal/api/hosts.go:384`: &amp;#34;API trusts the bearer token for authorisation; per-CA ownership is enforced only in the Web layer.&amp;#34; The Web UI gates state-changing routes through `loadAccessibleCA` (`internal/web/cas.go`); CA-management endpoints in `internal/api/cas.go` ALSO have proper `canAccessCA` gates. The gap is on the host, network, firewall, mobile-bundle, and most operator endpoints. Combined with the per-operator CA model from ADR 0002, this gives any non-admin operator API key broad cross-tenant access — instant privilege escalation in the worst case. Version 0.3.4 fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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