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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 13:51:18 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-65900 — DOMPurify before 3.4.8 Template Expression Injection via RETURN_DOM</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-65900</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; cure53 DOMPurify&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DOMPurify versions &amp;gt;=3.0.0 and before 3.4.8, when configured with SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES together with a DOM output mode (RETURN_DOM, RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT, or IN_PLACE), fail to strip template expressions (e.g. ${evil}, {{evil}}, &amp;lt;%evil%&amp;gt;) inside &amp;lt;template&amp;gt; element content. The final normalization/scrub pass (_scrubTemplateExpressions) uses a NodeIterator and node.normalize() that do not descend into template.content, so expressions that only form after adjacent text nodes merge survive sanitization. This bypasses SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES and can allow a downstream template engine to evaluate attacker-supplied expressions. The string output path is not affected.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; cure53 DOMPurify&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;DOMPurify versions &amp;gt;=3.0.0 and before 3.4.8, when configured with SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES together with a DOM output mode (RETURN_DOM, RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT, or IN_PLACE), fail to strip template expressions (e.g. ${evil}, {{evil}}, &amp;lt;%evil%&amp;gt;) inside &amp;lt;template&amp;gt; element content. The final normalization/scrub pass (_scrubTemplateExpressions) uses a NodeIterator and node.normalize() that do not descend into template.content, so expressions that only form after adjacent text nodes merge survive sanitization. This bypasses SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES and can allow a downstream template engine to evaluate attacker-supplied expressions. The string output path is not affected.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-65900</guid>
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