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      <title>CVE-2026-47416 — praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can promote themselves (or any other member) to owner via PATCH /workspaces/{i…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47416</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison praisonai-platform&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 are vulnerable to vertical privilege escalation. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)`, which defaults to `min_role=&amp;#34;member&amp;#34;` and is never overridden by the route. The handler then calls `MemberService.update_role(workspace_id, user_id, body.role)` which sets the target member&amp;#39;s role to whatever the request body specifies, with no check that the caller has owner-or-admin privilege, no check that the new role is not higher than the caller&amp;#39;s own, and no check that the caller is not silently promoting themselves. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison praisonai-platform&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 are vulnerable to vertical privilege escalation. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)`, which defaults to `min_role=&amp;#34;member&amp;#34;` and is never overridden by the route. The handler then calls `MemberService.update_role(workspace_id, user_id, body.role)` which sets the target member&amp;#39;s role to whatever the request body specifies, with no check that the caller has owner-or-admin privilege, no check that the new role is not higher than the caller&amp;#39;s own, and no check that the caller is not silently promoting themselves. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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