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      <title>CVE-2026-47413 — praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can add arbitrary user as owner via POST /workspaces/{id}/members</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47413</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison praisonai-platform&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have aprivilege escalation / cross-tenant member injection. The `POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&amp;#34;member&amp;#34;`) and forwards the request body&amp;#39;s `user_id` and `role` straight into `MemberService.add(workspace_id, user_id, role)`, which has no caller-permission check. A user with the lowest workspace privilege can add any user (including a new attacker-controlled second account, or an existing account they want to grief) as owner of the workspace. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MervinPraison praisonai-platform&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have aprivilege escalation / cross-tenant member injection. The `POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=&amp;#34;member&amp;#34;`) and forwards the request body&amp;#39;s `user_id` and `role` straight into `MemberService.add(workspace_id, user_id, role)`, which has no caller-permission check. A user with the lowest workspace privilege can add any user (including a new attacker-controlled second account, or an existing account they want to grief) as owner of the workspace. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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