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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 10:10:47 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-56416 — Possible heap buffer overflow when validator canonicalizes RDATA that contains domain name</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-56416</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NLnet Labs Unbound&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.1, when the validator builds the canonical RDATA form for an RRSIG-covered PX/RP/MINFO/SOA RRset, it computes the address of the second embedded domain name as &amp;#39;datstart + dname_valid(datstart, ...)&amp;#39; and passes it straight to &amp;#39;query_dname_tolower()&amp;#39; without checking that a second name is actually present in the RDATA. The wire-format parser accepts multi-dname RRs whose RDATA ends after the first name, so an attacker who runs a DNSSEC-signed authoritative server can deliver a record with an absent second domain name (e.g. SOA record) and cause &amp;#39;query_dname_tolower()&amp;#39; to walk label-by-label through stale bytes in the per-worker &amp;#39;env-&amp;gt;scratch_buffer&amp;#39;, past the end of that heap allocation if &amp;#39;msg-buffer-size&amp;#39; has been lowered from the default. This leads to heap buffer overflow and on a release build the outcome relies heavily on the contents of the buffer tail and the adjacent heap chunk.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; NLnet Labs Unbound&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.1, when the validator builds the canonical RDATA form for an RRSIG-covered PX/RP/MINFO/SOA RRset, it computes the address of the second embedded domain name as &amp;#39;datstart + dname_valid(datstart, ...)&amp;#39; and passes it straight to &amp;#39;query_dname_tolower()&amp;#39; without checking that a second name is actually present in the RDATA. The wire-format parser accepts multi-dname RRs whose RDATA ends after the first name, so an attacker who runs a DNSSEC-signed authoritative server can deliver a record with an absent second domain name (e.g. SOA record) and cause &amp;#39;query_dname_tolower()&amp;#39; to walk label-by-label through stale bytes in the per-worker &amp;#39;env-&amp;gt;scratch_buffer&amp;#39;, past the end of that heap allocation if &amp;#39;msg-buffer-size&amp;#39; has been lowered from the default. This leads to heap buffer overflow and on a release build the outcome relies heavily on the contents of the buffer tail and the adjacent heap chunk.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-56416</guid>
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