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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-46516 — Frogman vulnerable to stored XSS in chat console formatter (escalation vector in multi-admin deployments)</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-46516</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; mwtcmi frogman&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Frogman provides headless FreePBX control. Prior to version 1.6.6, Frogman&amp;#39;s chat-console markdown formatter (`assets/js/chat.js`&amp;#39;s `formatMarkdown`) inserted regex capture groups as raw HTML in four template patterns: inline code, bold, markdown links, and download links. Tool responses that reflect user-controlled fields — extension names, ring-group descriptions, IVR names, queue descriptions, etc. — could carry an HTML/JavaScript payload that executes when another admin views the response through Frogman chat. The payload runs in the viewer&amp;#39;s session, with the viewer&amp;#39;s permissions. FreePBX&amp;#39;s own admin GUI escapes these same fields via `freepbx_htmlspecialchars()` throughout its view templates. The chat formatter was the leaky side. Version 1.6.6 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; mwtcmi frogman&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Frogman provides headless FreePBX control. Prior to version 1.6.6, Frogman&amp;#39;s chat-console markdown formatter (`assets/js/chat.js`&amp;#39;s `formatMarkdown`) inserted regex capture groups as raw HTML in four template patterns: inline code, bold, markdown links, and download links. Tool responses that reflect user-controlled fields — extension names, ring-group descriptions, IVR names, queue descriptions, etc. — could carry an HTML/JavaScript payload that executes when another admin views the response through Frogman chat. The payload runs in the viewer&amp;#39;s session, with the viewer&amp;#39;s permissions. FreePBX&amp;#39;s own admin GUI escapes these same fields via `freepbx_htmlspecialchars()` throughout its view templates. The chat formatter was the leaky side. Version 1.6.6 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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