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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 07:59:50 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-58484 — Network-AI: Poisoned environment backup manifest allows arbitrary recursive deletion during backup pruning</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-58484</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Jovancoding Network-AI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.listBackups()` reads each backup&amp;#39;s `_manifest.json` and trusts the manifest&amp;#39;s `path` field. `EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups()` later passes that trusted `entry.path` directly to `rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true })`. An attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside `data/&amp;lt;env&amp;gt;/.backups/&amp;lt;name&amp;gt;/_manifest.json` can cause `network-ai env backup prune --env &amp;lt;env&amp;gt; --keep &amp;lt;n&amp;gt;` or any code path invoking `pruneBackups()` to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. This is fixed in v5.12.2. `pruneBackups()` no longer passes `entry.path` from the on-disk manifest to `rmSync`. The deletion path is recomputed from a format-validated `entry.backupId`, and a `dirname` containment check confines deletion to exactly one level under the backups directory. A poisoned manifest (e.g. `&amp;#34;path&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;/&amp;#34;`) is now inert.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Jovancoding Network-AI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.listBackups()` reads each backup&amp;#39;s `_manifest.json` and trusts the manifest&amp;#39;s `path` field. `EnvironmentManager.pruneBackups()` later passes that trusted `entry.path` directly to `rmSync(entry.path, { recursive: true, force: true })`. An attacker who can place or modify a manifest inside `data/&amp;lt;env&amp;gt;/.backups/&amp;lt;name&amp;gt;/_manifest.json` can cause `network-ai env backup prune --env &amp;lt;env&amp;gt; --keep &amp;lt;n&amp;gt;` or any code path invoking `pruneBackups()` to recursively delete an arbitrary path accessible to the Network-AI process user. This is fixed in v5.12.2. `pruneBackups()` no longer passes `entry.path` from the on-disk manifest to `rmSync`. The deletion path is recomputed from a format-validated `entry.backupId`, and a `dirname` containment check confines deletion to exactly one level under the backups directory. A poisoned manifest (e.g. `&amp;#34;path&amp;#34;: &amp;#34;/&amp;#34;`) is now inert.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-58484</guid>
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