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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 02:21:31 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-57860 — ForgeCode Arbitrary Code Execution via Unvetted .mcp.json in Untrusted Repository</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-57860</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; tailcallhq forgecode&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ForgeCode (tailcallhq/forgecode), an AI pair-programming CLI, automatically loads and executes the MCP servers defined in a repository&amp;#39;s .mcp.json file on startup without user confirmation. A malicious repository can supply a crafted .mcp.json whose mcpServers entries specify arbitrary command and args values (for example, command: bash with args: [&amp;#39;-c&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;touch /tmp/pwned&amp;#39;]). When a user runs the forge CLI inside a cloned untrusted repository, the specified commands are spawned with the invoking user&amp;#39;s privileges, resulting in arbitrary code execution. This provides a reliable initial-access and persistence primitive against developers who evaluate untrusted repositories with ForgeCode.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; tailcallhq forgecode&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ForgeCode (tailcallhq/forgecode), an AI pair-programming CLI, automatically loads and executes the MCP servers defined in a repository&amp;#39;s .mcp.json file on startup without user confirmation. A malicious repository can supply a crafted .mcp.json whose mcpServers entries specify arbitrary command and args values (for example, command: bash with args: [&amp;#39;-c&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;touch /tmp/pwned&amp;#39;]). When a user runs the forge CLI inside a cloned untrusted repository, the specified commands are spawned with the invoking user&amp;#39;s privileges, resulting in arbitrary code execution. This provides a reliable initial-access and persistence primitive against developers who evaluate untrusted repositories with ForgeCode.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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