<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 14:21:10 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-58413 — EnvironmentManager.restore() backup ID path traversal copies arbitrary directories into environment data</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-58413</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Jovancoding Network-AI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.restore(env, backupId)` computes the backup path with `join(envDir, &amp;#39;.backups&amp;#39;, backupId)` and only checks that this path exists. It does not resolve the result or verify that it remains under `data/&amp;lt;env&amp;gt;/.backups`. A caller can pass a traversal backup ID such as `../../../outside/source-dir` to restore files from an arbitrary directory into the target environment data directory. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `restore()` now validates `backupId` against `/^[\w\-]+$/` and asserts `dirname(resolve(join(backupsDir, backupId))) === resolve(backupsDir)` before touching the filesystem. Backup IDs containing path separators or `..` are rejected, so a crafted ID can no longer copy directories from outside `.backups/` into the environment.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Jovancoding Network-AI&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Network-AI is a TypeScript/Node.js multi-agent orchestrator. Prior to version 5.12.2, `EnvironmentManager.restore(env, backupId)` computes the backup path with `join(envDir, &amp;#39;.backups&amp;#39;, backupId)` and only checks that this path exists. It does not resolve the result or verify that it remains under `data/&amp;lt;env&amp;gt;/.backups`. A caller can pass a traversal backup ID such as `../../../outside/source-dir` to restore files from an arbitrary directory into the target environment data directory. The issue is fixed in v5.12.2. `restore()` now validates `backupId` against `/^[\w\-]+$/` and asserts `dirname(resolve(join(backupsDir, backupId))) === resolve(backupsDir)` before touching the filesystem. Backup IDs containing path separators or `..` are rejected, so a crafted ID can no longer copy directories from outside `.backups/` into the environment.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-58413</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
