<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 03:54:25 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-45713 — Mailpit: Unauthenticated remote memory-exhaustion DoS via unlimited SMTP DATA and /api/v1/send body sizes</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45713</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; axllent mailpit&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mailpit is an email testing tool and API for developers. Prior to version 1.30.0, the Mailpit SMTP server has a Server.MaxSize int field that controls the maximum allowed DATA payload size, but the field is never assigned anywhere outside test code, leaving it at Go&amp;#39;s zero value (0 ⇒ &amp;#34;no limit&amp;#34;). The same applies to the HTTP /api/v1/send endpoint, whose request body is decoded with json.NewDecoder(r.Body) and no http.MaxBytesReader. Because Mailpit&amp;#39;s default listeners bind [::]:1025 (SMTP) and [::]:8025 (HTTP), with no authentication required on either, a single network-reachable attacker can push an arbitrarily large message into Mailpit and watch RAM consumption spike with a ~7-10× amplification factor (raw frame → enmime envelope tree → search-text index → zstd-encoded write to SQLite). Repeating the attack — or running it concurrently from multiple connections — drives the process to OOM-kill. Version 1.30.0 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; axllent mailpit&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Mailpit is an email testing tool and API for developers. Prior to version 1.30.0, the Mailpit SMTP server has a Server.MaxSize int field that controls the maximum allowed DATA payload size, but the field is never assigned anywhere outside test code, leaving it at Go&amp;#39;s zero value (0 ⇒ &amp;#34;no limit&amp;#34;). The same applies to the HTTP /api/v1/send endpoint, whose request body is decoded with json.NewDecoder(r.Body) and no http.MaxBytesReader. Because Mailpit&amp;#39;s default listeners bind [::]:1025 (SMTP) and [::]:8025 (HTTP), with no authentication required on either, a single network-reachable attacker can push an arbitrarily large message into Mailpit and watch RAM consumption spike with a ~7-10× amplification factor (raw frame → enmime envelope tree → search-text index → zstd-encoded write to SQLite). Repeating the attack — or running it concurrently from multiple connections — drives the process to OOM-kill. Version 1.30.0 contains a patch.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-45713</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
