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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 18:19:45 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-59695 — Unbounded max_fee_per_gas in mpp Tempo fee-payer enables single-request wallet drain</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-59695</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ZenHive mpp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet in a single request by naming an arbitrarily high gas price.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), MPP.Tempo.Transaction.cosign_fee_payer/3 re-signs the client-supplied base fields of the 0x76 AASigned envelope verbatim, including max_fee_per_gas and max_priority_fee_per_gas, without validating that they are within reasonable bounds. A malicious client embeds arbitrarily large values for these fields in the signed envelope. The server co-signs and broadcasts the transaction. The effective_gas_price billed against the fee-payer wallet is derived from the attacker-supplied ceilings, so the server pays those inflated per-gas rates out of its own wallet. A single crafted request can drain the wallet entirely, after which the server can no longer sponsor gas for legitimate payment requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ZenHive mpp&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet in a single request by naming an arbitrarily high gas price.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), MPP.Tempo.Transaction.cosign_fee_payer/3 re-signs the client-supplied base fields of the 0x76 AASigned envelope verbatim, including max_fee_per_gas and max_priority_fee_per_gas, without validating that they are within reasonable bounds. A malicious client embeds arbitrarily large values for these fields in the signed envelope. The server co-signs and broadcasts the transaction. The effective_gas_price billed against the fee-payer wallet is derived from the attacker-supplied ceilings, so the server pays those inflated per-gas rates out of its own wallet. A single crafted request can drain the wallet entirely, after which the server can no longer sponsor gas for legitimate payment requests.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-59695</guid>
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