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      <title>CVE-2026-47751 — Claude Code Action: Malicious MCP Server Configuration in PRs Enables Remote Code Execution and Secret Exfiltration</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-47751</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; anthropics claude-code-action&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Claude Code Action is a general-purpose GitHub action that runs Claude Code on GitHub pull requests and issues. Prior to 1.0.74, because the action checked out attacker-controlled pull request head branches, read .mcp.json from the working directory via default setting sources, and unconditionally enabled all project MCP servers via enableAllProjectMcpServers, an attacker who opened a pull request containing a malicious .mcp.json file could achieve arbitrary code execution on the GitHub Actions runner and exfiltrate secrets available to the workflow (such as API keys and tokens) when a privileged user or an automatic trigger invoked the Claude action on the pull request. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.74, which restores .claude/ and .mcp.json from the pull request base branch before the CLI runs.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; anthropics claude-code-action&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Claude Code Action is a general-purpose GitHub action that runs Claude Code on GitHub pull requests and issues. Prior to 1.0.74, because the action checked out attacker-controlled pull request head branches, read .mcp.json from the working directory via default setting sources, and unconditionally enabled all project MCP servers via enableAllProjectMcpServers, an attacker who opened a pull request containing a malicious .mcp.json file could achieve arbitrary code execution on the GitHub Actions runner and exfiltrate secrets available to the workflow (such as API keys and tokens) when a privileged user or an automatic trigger invoked the Claude action on the pull request. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.74, which restores .claude/ and .mcp.json from the pull request base branch before the CLI runs.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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