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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 04:42:13 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-42208 — LiteLLM: SQL injection in Proxy API key verification</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-42208</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; BerriAI litellm, Red Hat Lightspeed Core, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2, Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. From version 1.81.16 to before version 1.83.7, a database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted Authorization header to any LLM API route (for example POST /chat/completions) and reach this query through the proxy&amp;#39;s error-handling path. An attacker could read data from the proxy&amp;#39;s database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages. This issue has been patched in version 1.83.7.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; BerriAI litellm, Red Hat Lightspeed Core, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2, Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. From version 1.81.16 to before version 1.83.7, a database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted Authorization header to any LLM API route (for example POST /chat/completions) and reach this query through the proxy&amp;#39;s error-handling path. An attacker could read data from the proxy&amp;#39;s database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages. This issue has been patched in version 1.83.7.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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