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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 02:24:32 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-44477 — CloudNativePG: Metrics exporter allows privilege escalation to PostgreSQL superuser and OS RCE</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44477</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; cloudnative-pg, Red Hat Openshift Data Foundation 4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CloudNativePG is a platform designed to manage PostgreSQL databases within Kubernetes environments. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.28.3, the CloudNativePG metrics exporter opens its PostgreSQL connection as the postgres superuser via the pod-local Unix socket, then demotes the session with SET ROLE pg_monitor. SET ROLE changes only current_user; session_user remains postgres. Any SQL expression evaluated inside the scrape session can invoke RESET ROLE to recover real superuser privileges, then use COPY ... TO PROGRAM to spawn an OS-level subprocess as the postgres user inside the primary pod. The READ ONLY transaction flag does not block this; it gates writes to database state, not external processes. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.29.1 and 1.28.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; cloudnative-pg, Red Hat Openshift Data Foundation 4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CloudNativePG is a platform designed to manage PostgreSQL databases within Kubernetes environments. Prior to 1.29.1 and 1.28.3, the CloudNativePG metrics exporter opens its PostgreSQL connection as the postgres superuser via the pod-local Unix socket, then demotes the session with SET ROLE pg_monitor. SET ROLE changes only current_user; session_user remains postgres. Any SQL expression evaluated inside the scrape session can invoke RESET ROLE to recover real superuser privileges, then use COPY ... TO PROGRAM to spawn an OS-level subprocess as the postgres user inside the primary pod. The READ ONLY transaction flag does not block this; it gates writes to database state, not external processes. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.29.1 and 1.28.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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