https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 16 Oct 2026 16:57:42 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-10660 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> zephyrproject zephyr</p> <p>The Bluetooth BAP Broadcast Assistant GATT client in subsys/bluetooth/audio/bap_broadcast_assistant.c reassembled remote Broadcast Receive State data into a single file-static net_buf_simple (att_buf, BT_ATT_MAX_ATTRIBUTE_LEN = 512 bytes) shared by all connection instances, while the BUSY flag, long-read handle, and reset/offset state were per-connection.</p> <p>When the device acts as a Broadcast Assistant connected to multiple Scan Delegator peripherals, notification and long-read callbacks from different connections interleave on the shared buffer: the append in notify_handler (net_buf_simple_add_mem at the not-busy branch) performs no tailroom check, so receive-state notifications from two or more delegators accumulate on the same 512-byte buffer and, with a sufficiently large configured ATT MTU (BT_L2CAP_TX_MTU up to 2000) and two-to-three concurrent connections, write past the buffer into adjacent .bss (net_buf_simple_add only asserts in debug builds).</p> <p>Even below the overflow threshold, one connection&#39;s net_buf_simple_reset zeroes the shared length while another connection&#39;s reassembly and GATT read offset are in flight, mixing one peer&#39;s data into another&#39;s parse. A malicious or compromised Scan Delegator (or two colluding peers) over BLE can trigger this, causing out-of-bounds writes (memory corruption / denial of service) and cross-connection data corruption.</p> <p>The fix moves the buffer into the per-connection instance struct so each connection reassembles into its own buf…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> zephyrproject zephyr</p> <p>The Bluetooth BAP Broadcast Assistant GATT client in subsys/bluetooth/audio/bap_broadcast_assistant.c reassembled remote Broadcast Receive State data into a single file-static net_buf_simple (att_buf, BT_ATT_MAX_ATTRIBUTE_LEN = 512 bytes) shared by all connection instances, while the BUSY flag, long-read handle, and reset/offset state were per-connection.</p> <p>When the device acts as a Broadcast Assistant connected to multiple Scan Delegator peripherals, notification and long-read callbacks from different connections interleave on the shared buffer: the append in notify_handler (net_buf_simple_add_mem at the not-busy branch) performs no tailroom check, so receive-state notifications from two or more delegators accumulate on the same 512-byte buffer and, with a sufficiently large configured ATT MTU (BT_L2CAP_TX_MTU up to 2000) and two-to-three concurrent connections, write past the buffer into adjacent .bss (net_buf_simple_add only asserts in debug builds).</p> <p>Even below the overflow threshold, one connection&#39;s net_buf_simple_reset zeroes the shared length while another connection&#39;s reassembly and GATT read offset are in flight, mixing one peer&#39;s data into another&#39;s parse. A malicious or compromised Scan Delegator (or two colluding peers) over BLE can trigger this, causing out-of-bounds writes (memory corruption / denial of service) and cross-connection data corruption.</p> <p>The fix moves the buffer into the per-connection instance struct so each connection reassembles into its own buf…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-10660