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      <title>CVE-2026-52841 — Easy!Appointments: Authorization bypass in Google OAuth provider binding lets any backend user rebind a peer provider's…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-52841</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; alextselegidis easyappointments&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions prior to 1.6.0, `Google::oauth` at `application/controllers/Google.php:278` stores its URL-supplied `provider_id` in the session, and `oauth_callback` saves the issued Google OAuth token against that row without checking the caller owns the provider. Any logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) rebinds a peer provider&amp;#39;s Google sync to a Google account they control. The peer&amp;#39;s appointments then sync into the attacker&amp;#39;s calendar with each customer&amp;#39;s name and email attached as attendee data. Version 1.6.0 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; alextselegidis easyappointments&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Easy!Appointments is a self hosted appointment scheduler. In versions prior to 1.6.0, `Google::oauth` at `application/controllers/Google.php:278` stores its URL-supplied `provider_id` in the session, and `oauth_callback` saves the issued Google OAuth token against that row without checking the caller owns the provider. Any logged-in backend user (admin, provider, or secretary) rebinds a peer provider&amp;#39;s Google sync to a Google account they control. The peer&amp;#39;s appointments then sync into the attacker&amp;#39;s calendar with each customer&amp;#39;s name and email attached as attendee data. Version 1.6.0 patches the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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