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      <title>CVE-2026-58499 — Path traversal in EverOS /api/v1/memory/add via unvalidated sender_id</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-58499</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; EverMind-AI EverOS&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;EverOS is a memory runtime for agents. Prior to 1.0.1, EverOS is vulnerable to path traversal in the POST /api/v1/memory/add ingestion endpoint because the per-message sender_id field was not validated as a path-safe identifier, unlike app_id and project_id. During user-memory extraction, sender_id is used as owner_id and joined into the filesystem path where the extracted episode is persisted as a Markdown file, so a sender_id containing ../ sequences could direct writes outside the configured memory root and allow an unauthenticated caller to create or overwrite .md files at locations writable by the server process with partially attacker-influenced content. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; EverMind-AI EverOS&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;EverOS is a memory runtime for agents. Prior to 1.0.1, EverOS is vulnerable to path traversal in the POST /api/v1/memory/add ingestion endpoint because the per-message sender_id field was not validated as a path-safe identifier, unlike app_id and project_id. During user-memory extraction, sender_id is used as owner_id and joined into the filesystem path where the extracted episode is persisted as a Markdown file, so a sender_id containing ../ sequences could direct writes outside the configured memory root and allow an unauthenticated caller to create or overwrite .md files at locations writable by the server process with partially attacker-influenced content. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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