https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 20:02:12 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-12597 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> LoginPress Pro</p> <p>The LoginPress Pro plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via the GitHub OAuth callback in versions up to, and including, 6.2.3. The vulnerability exists in the loginpress_on_github_login() function, which blindly trusts the first element (profile[0][&#39;email&#39;]) of the array returned by GitHub&#39;s /user/emails endpoint as an account-binding identifier without verifying that the email carries a verified === true status. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing WordPress user, including administrators, by adding an unverified email address matching a local account to their GitHub profile and triggering the OAuth callback via a crafted code parameter — causing the plugin to call get_user_by(&#39;email&#39;, ...) and establish an authenticated session for the matched account. Practical exploitation is conditional on GitHub returning the attacker-added unverified email at index 0 of the /user/emails response, as GitHub typically prioritizes the primary verified address first; nonetheless, the absence of any email verification check in the plugin constitutes a fundamental authentication bypass flaw.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> LoginPress Pro</p> <p>The LoginPress Pro plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via the GitHub OAuth callback in versions up to, and including, 6.2.3. The vulnerability exists in the loginpress_on_github_login() function, which blindly trusts the first element (profile[0][&#39;email&#39;]) of the array returned by GitHub&#39;s /user/emails endpoint as an account-binding identifier without verifying that the email carries a verified === true status. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any existing WordPress user, including administrators, by adding an unverified email address matching a local account to their GitHub profile and triggering the OAuth callback via a crafted code parameter — causing the plugin to call get_user_by(&#39;email&#39;, ...) and establish an authenticated session for the matched account. Practical exploitation is conditional on GitHub returning the attacker-added unverified email at index 0 of the /user/emails response, as GitHub typically prioritizes the primary verified address first; nonetheless, the absence of any email verification check in the plugin constitutes a fundamental authentication bypass flaw.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-12597