<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 11:44:40 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-44042 — UltraVNC repeater wi_uudecode off-by-one in base64 decode boundary check</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44042</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; uvnc UltraVNC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;UltraVNC repeater through 1.8.2.2 contains an off-by-one error in the Base64 decode helper used for HTTP Basic authentication. In repeater/webgui/webutils.c:817, the wi_uudecode() function checks whether the input length exceeds the output buffer with a strict greater-than comparison (&amp;gt;), while the correct check should be greater-than-or-equal (&amp;gt;=). When strlen(authdata) equals sizeof(decode), the decoded output length (approximately 3/4 of input) does not overflow the buffer in current practice because the outer HTTP request bounds constrain the Authorization header. However, the defective check leaves a latent off-by-one condition that could become exploitable if the buffering constraints change. The current risk is limited to a one-byte write at the boundary of a 1024-byte stack buffer under constrained conditions.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; uvnc UltraVNC&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;UltraVNC repeater through 1.8.2.2 contains an off-by-one error in the Base64 decode helper used for HTTP Basic authentication. In repeater/webgui/webutils.c:817, the wi_uudecode() function checks whether the input length exceeds the output buffer with a strict greater-than comparison (&amp;gt;), while the correct check should be greater-than-or-equal (&amp;gt;=). When strlen(authdata) equals sizeof(decode), the decoded output length (approximately 3/4 of input) does not overflow the buffer in current practice because the outer HTTP request bounds constrain the Authorization header. However, the defective check leaves a latent off-by-one condition that could become exploitable if the buffering constraints change. The current risk is limited to a one-byte write at the boundary of a 1024-byte stack buffer under constrained conditions.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-44042</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
