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      <title>CVE-2026-55438 — Coder's workspace app CORS origin check can be bypassed via UUID-based subdomain spoofing</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-55438</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; coder&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Coder allows organizations to provision remote development environments via Terraform. Prior to versions 2.29.17, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2, Coder&amp;#39;s subdomain-based workspace app proxy allowed the same-owner CORS check to be bypassed. When a workspace-name subdomain segment parsed as a UUID, the workspace was resolved by ID without confirming the URL&amp;#39;s username matched the real owner, while the CORS middleware trusted the unverified username in the hostname. Practical exploitation requires subdomain app routing (wildcard hostname) enabled and a victim who visits the attacker&amp;#39;s crafted app URL while authenticated. The fix in versions 2.29.17, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2 validates the subdomain username against the resolved workspace&amp;#39;s actual owner and bases the same-owner CORS decision on the authoritative owner identity. No known workarounds are available.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; coder&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Coder allows organizations to provision remote development environments via Terraform. Prior to versions 2.29.17, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2, Coder&amp;#39;s subdomain-based workspace app proxy allowed the same-owner CORS check to be bypassed. When a workspace-name subdomain segment parsed as a UUID, the workspace was resolved by ID without confirming the URL&amp;#39;s username matched the real owner, while the CORS middleware trusted the unverified username in the hostname. Practical exploitation requires subdomain app routing (wildcard hostname) enabled and a victim who visits the attacker&amp;#39;s crafted app URL while authenticated. The fix in versions 2.29.17, 2.32.7, 2.33.8, and 2.34.2 validates the subdomain username against the resolved workspace&amp;#39;s actual owner and bases the same-owner CORS decision on the authoritative owner identity. No known workarounds are available.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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