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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-58657 — Grav - Stored CSS Injection via Markdown Image resize() Action</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-58657</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Grav&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Grav before 2.0.0 (affected through 2.0.0-rc.9 and the 2.0 branch) contains a stored CSS injection vulnerability in the Markdown image resize() media action. Prior media hardening rejects direct ?style= payloads and unsafe attribute() fallbacks, but the resize() action in Excerpts::processMediaActions() writes caller-controlled values directly into the image&amp;#39;s styleAttributes. A lower-privileged content editor who can edit page Markdown can store a crafted image URL with semicolon-delimited CSS declarations in the resize parameters, which are rendered into the final &amp;lt;img style=...&amp;gt; attribute when a higher-privileged reviewer/admin views the page or preview. This does not require JavaScript execution but enables UI redress/overlay and content-manipulation attacks (e.g., a full-viewport fixed overlay). Fixed in 2.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Grav&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Grav before 2.0.0 (affected through 2.0.0-rc.9 and the 2.0 branch) contains a stored CSS injection vulnerability in the Markdown image resize() media action. Prior media hardening rejects direct ?style= payloads and unsafe attribute() fallbacks, but the resize() action in Excerpts::processMediaActions() writes caller-controlled values directly into the image&amp;#39;s styleAttributes. A lower-privileged content editor who can edit page Markdown can store a crafted image URL with semicolon-delimited CSS declarations in the resize parameters, which are rendered into the final &amp;lt;img style=...&amp;gt; attribute when a higher-privileged reviewer/admin views the page or preview. This does not require JavaScript execution but enables UI redress/overlay and content-manipulation attacks (e.g., a full-viewport fixed overlay). Fixed in 2.0.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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