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      <title>CVE-2026-46354 — Coder: PKCS#7 signature bypass in Azure instance identity allows unauthenticated agent token theft</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-46354</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; coder&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Coder allows organizations to provision remote development environments via Terraform. In versions prior tp 2.24.5, 2.29.13, 2.30.8, 2.31.12, 2.32.2, and 2.33.3, `azureidentity.Validate()` verifies that the PKCS#7 signer certificate chains to a trusted Azure CA but never verifies the PKCS#7 signature itself. An attacker can embed a legitimate Azure certificate alongside arbitrary content e.g. `{&amp;#34;vmId&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;&amp;lt;target&amp;gt;&amp;#34;}` and the forged `vmId` will be accepted returning the victim workspace agent&amp;#39;s session token. No authentication is required. The attacker only needs to know a target VM&amp;#39;s `vmId` which is a `UUIDv4`. That&amp;#39;s a practical limitation which would typically require prior access to be exploited. Versions 2.24.5, 2.29.13, 2.30.8, 2.31.12, 2.32.2, and 2.33.3 patch the issue. As a workaround, reconfigure any Azure templates to use token authentication rather than `azure-instance-identity`.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; coder&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Coder allows organizations to provision remote development environments via Terraform. In versions prior tp 2.24.5, 2.29.13, 2.30.8, 2.31.12, 2.32.2, and 2.33.3, `azureidentity.Validate()` verifies that the PKCS#7 signer certificate chains to a trusted Azure CA but never verifies the PKCS#7 signature itself. An attacker can embed a legitimate Azure certificate alongside arbitrary content e.g. `{&amp;#34;vmId&amp;#34;:&amp;#34;&amp;lt;target&amp;gt;&amp;#34;}` and the forged `vmId` will be accepted returning the victim workspace agent&amp;#39;s session token. No authentication is required. The attacker only needs to know a target VM&amp;#39;s `vmId` which is a `UUIDv4`. That&amp;#39;s a practical limitation which would typically require prior access to be exploited. Versions 2.24.5, 2.29.13, 2.30.8, 2.31.12, 2.32.2, and 2.33.3 patch the issue. As a workaround, reconfigure any Azure templates to use token authentication rather than `azure-instance-identity`.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-46354</guid>
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