https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 19:07:50 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-46584 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel Mail</p> <p>Improper Input Validation, Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in Apache Camel Mail Component.</p> <p>The camel-mail producer (MailProducer.getSender) scanned the outgoing Exchange for message headers in the mail.smtp. / mail.smtps. namespace and, when any were present, built a per-message JavaMail sender with those values applied as JavaMail session properties, overriding the endpoint configuration. This namespace is Camel-internal - only MailProducer interprets it - and was not blocked by any HeaderFilterStrategy, so the values could originate from any inbound protocol (for example platform-http query parameters or request headers, or JMS / Kafka messages from untrusted producers) that feeds a route ending in an smtp / smtps producer without an intervening removeHeaders. The maximal impact is version-dependent: on releases before 4.19.0, setting mail.smtp.host redirects the SMTP connection to a server under the attacker&#39;s control, and because the producer then authenticates with the endpoint&#39;s configured username and password those credentials are transmitted to the attacker; on 4.19.0 and later the producer connects to the endpoint&#39;s configured host explicitly, so the reachable impact is limited to weakening transport security (for example mail.smtp.ssl.trust, mail.smtp.starttls.enable or mail.smtp.socks.host) and interception of the outgoing message rather than host redirect. Exploitation requires a route that channels untrusted input into…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel Mail</p> <p>Improper Input Validation, Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor vulnerability in Apache Camel Mail Component.</p> <p>The camel-mail producer (MailProducer.getSender) scanned the outgoing Exchange for message headers in the mail.smtp. / mail.smtps. namespace and, when any were present, built a per-message JavaMail sender with those values applied as JavaMail session properties, overriding the endpoint configuration. This namespace is Camel-internal - only MailProducer interprets it - and was not blocked by any HeaderFilterStrategy, so the values could originate from any inbound protocol (for example platform-http query parameters or request headers, or JMS / Kafka messages from untrusted producers) that feeds a route ending in an smtp / smtps producer without an intervening removeHeaders. The maximal impact is version-dependent: on releases before 4.19.0, setting mail.smtp.host redirects the SMTP connection to a server under the attacker&#39;s control, and because the producer then authenticates with the endpoint&#39;s configured username and password those credentials are transmitted to the attacker; on 4.19.0 and later the producer connects to the endpoint&#39;s configured host explicitly, so the reachable impact is limited to weakening transport security (for example mail.smtp.ssl.trust, mail.smtp.starttls.enable or mail.smtp.socks.host) and interception of the outgoing message rather than host redirect. Exploitation requires a route that channels untrusted input into…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-46584