https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 06 Oct 2026 07:44:21 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-42527 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel</p> <p>Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.</p> <p>The default ObjectInputFilter pattern shipped with several Apache Camel components for defense-in-depth deserialization filtering (&#39;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*&#39;, or the no-&#39;javax.**&#39; variant in the aggregation-repository components) uses a recursive &#39;java.**&#39; glob that admits classes whose hashCode/equals/readObject methods perform network I/O, notably java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress. When an attacker can deliver a Java-serialized payload to an affected Camel consumer, deserialization of a HashMap (or any collection that calls hashCode on its elements) containing java.net.URL keys causes the JVM to issue DNS queries to the attacker-supplied host during the deserialization side-effect. The class-level filter check passes because the resulting object&#39;s class (HashMap) is allow-listed; the DNS query is observable on an attacker-controlled DNS server, providing an out-of-band side channel. The exposure is highest on the camel-jms family because JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms invokes ObjectMessage.getObject() unconditionally when mapJmsMessage=true (default). Affected components: camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-amqp, camel-mina, camel-netty, camel-netty-http, camel-vertx-http, camel-infinispan, and the aggregation repository components camel-leveldb, camel-cassandraql, camel-consul, camel-sql (JDBC aggregation repository). This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.14.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel</p> <p>Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.</p> <p>The default ObjectInputFilter pattern shipped with several Apache Camel components for defense-in-depth deserialization filtering (&#39;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*&#39;, or the no-&#39;javax.**&#39; variant in the aggregation-repository components) uses a recursive &#39;java.**&#39; glob that admits classes whose hashCode/equals/readObject methods perform network I/O, notably java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress. When an attacker can deliver a Java-serialized payload to an affected Camel consumer, deserialization of a HashMap (or any collection that calls hashCode on its elements) containing java.net.URL keys causes the JVM to issue DNS queries to the attacker-supplied host during the deserialization side-effect. The class-level filter check passes because the resulting object&#39;s class (HashMap) is allow-listed; the DNS query is observable on an attacker-controlled DNS server, providing an out-of-band side channel. The exposure is highest on the camel-jms family because JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms invokes ObjectMessage.getObject() unconditionally when mapJmsMessage=true (default). Affected components: camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-amqp, camel-mina, camel-netty, camel-netty-http, camel-vertx-http, camel-infinispan, and the aggregation repository components camel-leveldb, camel-cassandraql, camel-consul, camel-sql (JDBC aggregation repository). This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.14.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before…</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-42527