<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 12:43:39 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-9180 — MotoPress Appointment Booking &lt;= 2.4.4 - Unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference to 'payment_details.booking_i…</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-9180</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; jetmonsters MotoPress Appointment Booking&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The MotoPress Appointment Booking plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.4. This is due to the `POST /motopress/appointment/v1/bookings` REST endpoint being registered with `&amp;#39;permission_callback&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; &amp;#39;__return_true&amp;#39;`, allowing unauthenticated access, while the `createBooking` handler in `BookingsRestController.php` accepts an attacker-supplied `payment_details.booking_id` value and loads the referenced booking via `findById()` without verifying that the caller owns or has any rights to that booking. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to overwrite the customer name, email address, phone number, and `customer_id` of any non-confirmed victim booking by submitting a request with no reservation items, causing `BookingService::createBooking()` to load the existing victim booking object and persist it with attacker-controlled customer data. Victim booking IDs can be harvested prior to exploitation without authentication by querying the also-publicly-accessible `GET /motopress/appointment/v1/bookings/reservations` endpoint with a guessable `service_id` and date range, and only bookings whose status is not `STATUS_CONFIRMED` (e.g., pending or auto-draft) are valid targets.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; jetmonsters MotoPress Appointment Booking&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The MotoPress Appointment Booking plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key in all versions up to, and including, 2.4.4. This is due to the `POST /motopress/appointment/v1/bookings` REST endpoint being registered with `&amp;#39;permission_callback&amp;#39; =&amp;gt; &amp;#39;__return_true&amp;#39;`, allowing unauthenticated access, while the `createBooking` handler in `BookingsRestController.php` accepts an attacker-supplied `payment_details.booking_id` value and loads the referenced booking via `findById()` without verifying that the caller owns or has any rights to that booking. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to overwrite the customer name, email address, phone number, and `customer_id` of any non-confirmed victim booking by submitting a request with no reservation items, causing `BookingService::createBooking()` to load the existing victim booking object and persist it with attacker-controlled customer data. Victim booking IDs can be harvested prior to exploitation without authentication by querying the also-publicly-accessible `GET /motopress/appointment/v1/bookings/reservations` endpoint with a guessable `service_id` and date range, and only bookings whose status is not `STATUS_CONFIRMED` (e.g., pending or auto-draft) are valid targets.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-9180</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
