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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 05:31:38 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-58399 — @acastellon/auth has an authentication bypass via spoofable headers in validateToken()</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-58399</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; antonio-castellon module-auth&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;@acastellon/auth is an authentication control system for microservices. Versions prior to 2.3.0 appear to allow an unauthenticated authentication bypass in validateToken() through spoofable auth-user and Host request headers. The validateToken middleware contains a service-to-service bypass for auth-user: service-brother when req.get(&amp;#39;host&amp;#39;).startsWith(getHostName()). Both values involved in the check can be influenced by an unauthenticated HTTP client: auth-user is a request header, and Host is also client-controlled. As a result, a remote unauthenticated attacker can send a request with crafted headers and bypass token validation before the normal legacy/JWT/OIDC validation logic runs. A fix has been implemented in v2.3.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; antonio-castellon module-auth&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;@acastellon/auth is an authentication control system for microservices. Versions prior to 2.3.0 appear to allow an unauthenticated authentication bypass in validateToken() through spoofable auth-user and Host request headers. The validateToken middleware contains a service-to-service bypass for auth-user: service-brother when req.get(&amp;#39;host&amp;#39;).startsWith(getHostName()). Both values involved in the check can be influenced by an unauthenticated HTTP client: auth-user is a request header, and Host is also client-controlled. As a result, a remote unauthenticated attacker can send a request with crafted headers and bypass token validation before the normal legacy/JWT/OIDC validation logic runs. A fix has been implemented in v2.3.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-58399</guid>
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