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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 17:47:01 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-12616</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-12616</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Eclipse Foundation Eclipse CSI - PIA&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The /v1/upload/sbom endpoint extracts the iss claim from the attacker-supplied JWT with signature verification disabled, then interpolates that string into three log statements before any validation gate. Because the configured log format (&amp;#34;%(asctime)s - %(name)s - %(levelname)s - %(message)s&amp;#34;) renders newlines literally, an unauthenticated attacker can forge log records that are byte-for-byte indistinguishable from PIA&amp;#39;s genuine &amp;#34;Successfully authenticated project&amp;#34; message. PIA is an authentication broker whose logs are explicitly relied upon for incident response (DESIGN.md §5.4 lists &amp;#34;Token verifications&amp;#34; and &amp;#34;Errors&amp;#34; as events to log), so the ability to plant fake auth-success entries directly undermines the audit trail the service exists to produce.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Eclipse Foundation Eclipse CSI - PIA&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The /v1/upload/sbom endpoint extracts the iss claim from the attacker-supplied JWT with signature verification disabled, then interpolates that string into three log statements before any validation gate. Because the configured log format (&amp;#34;%(asctime)s - %(name)s - %(levelname)s - %(message)s&amp;#34;) renders newlines literally, an unauthenticated attacker can forge log records that are byte-for-byte indistinguishable from PIA&amp;#39;s genuine &amp;#34;Successfully authenticated project&amp;#34; message. PIA is an authentication broker whose logs are explicitly relied upon for incident response (DESIGN.md §5.4 lists &amp;#34;Token verifications&amp;#34; and &amp;#34;Errors&amp;#34; as events to log), so the ability to plant fake auth-success entries directly undermines the audit trail the service exists to produce.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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