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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 06 Oct 2026 13:12:54 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-55441 — mise: Arbitrary command execution via task-include files in an untrusted, config-less repository</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-55441</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; jdx mise&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mise manages dev tools like node, python, cmake, and terraform. Prior to 2026.6.4, mise&amp;#39;s trust feature gates config files (mise.toml, .tool-versions) through trust_check, but task-include files are loaded on a path that never reaches it. When a directory has a task-include dir (mise-tasks/, .mise/tasks/, …) but no config file, mise falls back to the default includes and renders each task&amp;#39;s tera fields — and that tera environment has exec() registered. A {{ exec(command=&amp;#39;…&amp;#39;) }} in any rendered field runs arbitrary commands the moment the tasks are merely listed. There&amp;#39;s no config file to gate on, so no trust prompt ever appears. Read-only commands trigger it: mise tasks, mise task ls, mise run, mise tasks --usage (the query shell completion runs on Tab). The victim only has to cd into a cloned repo and list or tab-complete a task. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.6.4.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; jdx mise&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mise manages dev tools like node, python, cmake, and terraform. Prior to 2026.6.4, mise&amp;#39;s trust feature gates config files (mise.toml, .tool-versions) through trust_check, but task-include files are loaded on a path that never reaches it. When a directory has a task-include dir (mise-tasks/, .mise/tasks/, …) but no config file, mise falls back to the default includes and renders each task&amp;#39;s tera fields — and that tera environment has exec() registered. A {{ exec(command=&amp;#39;…&amp;#39;) }} in any rendered field runs arbitrary commands the moment the tasks are merely listed. There&amp;#39;s no config file to gate on, so no trust prompt ever appears. Read-only commands trigger it: mise tasks, mise task ls, mise run, mise tasks --usage (the query shell completion runs on Tab). The victim only has to cd into a cloned repo and list or tab-complete a task. This vulnerability is fixed in 2026.6.4.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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