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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 07:49:33 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-13318 — Virt-api-rhel9: kubevirt: kubevirt: ssrf in virt-api port-forward via unvalidated guest-agent-reported ip</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-13318</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Red Hat OpenShift Virtualization 4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw was found in KubeVirt&amp;#39;s virt-api port-forward handler. When processing a port-forward request to a VirtualMachineInstance (VMI), virt-api reads the target IP from vmi.Status.Interfaces[0].IP and passes it directly to net.Dial() without validation. For VMIs using non-masquerade network bindings (bridge or secondary-only), this IP is reported by the QEMU guest agent running inside the VM and is fully controllable by the VM owner. An attacker with kubevirt.io:edit permissions can create a VM with a modified guest agent that reports an arbitrary IP address, then request port-forward to establish a bidirectional TCP tunnel from virt-api&amp;#39;s cluster-internal network position to any routable destination, bypassing NetworkPolicy isolation.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Red Hat OpenShift Virtualization 4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw was found in KubeVirt&amp;#39;s virt-api port-forward handler. When processing a port-forward request to a VirtualMachineInstance (VMI), virt-api reads the target IP from vmi.Status.Interfaces[0].IP and passes it directly to net.Dial() without validation. For VMIs using non-masquerade network bindings (bridge or secondary-only), this IP is reported by the QEMU guest agent running inside the VM and is fully controllable by the VM owner. An attacker with kubevirt.io:edit permissions can create a VM with a modified guest agent that reports an arbitrary IP address, then request port-forward to establish a bidirectional TCP tunnel from virt-api&amp;#39;s cluster-internal network position to any routable destination, bypassing NetworkPolicy isolation.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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