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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 01:21:26 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-52811 — Gogs: UploadRepoFiles writes outside repo working tree via committed parent sym</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-52811</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; gogs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, (*Repository).UploadRepoFiles checks for symlinks only on the leaf of the upload target (osx.IsSymlink(targetPath)). The siblings UpdateRepoFile, DeleteRepoFile, and GetDiffPreview use hasSymlinkInPath, which lstats every component — UploadRepoFiles is the lone outlier. An attacker with repo-write access plus a multipart upload whose filename contains a literal backslash (preserved by filepath.Base on Linux, then converted to / by pathx.Clean) redirects the write through a previously-committed directory symlink. iox.CopyFile opens the destination with os.Create (no O_NOFOLLOW), so the kernel follows the parent symlink and writes attacker bytes anywhere the gogs UID can write — ~git/.ssh/authorized_keys → SSH foothold, or &amp;lt;repo&amp;gt;.git/hooks/post-receive → next-push RCE. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; gogs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. Prior to 0.14.3, (*Repository).UploadRepoFiles checks for symlinks only on the leaf of the upload target (osx.IsSymlink(targetPath)). The siblings UpdateRepoFile, DeleteRepoFile, and GetDiffPreview use hasSymlinkInPath, which lstats every component — UploadRepoFiles is the lone outlier. An attacker with repo-write access plus a multipart upload whose filename contains a literal backslash (preserved by filepath.Base on Linux, then converted to / by pathx.Clean) redirects the write through a previously-committed directory symlink. iox.CopyFile opens the destination with os.Create (no O_NOFOLLOW), so the kernel follows the parent symlink and writes attacker bytes anywhere the gogs UID can write — ~git/.ssh/authorized_keys → SSH foothold, or &amp;lt;repo&amp;gt;.git/hooks/post-receive → next-push RCE. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.14.3.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-52811</guid>
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