<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 08 Oct 2026 06:55:11 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-31978 — motionEye: Arbitrary File Read via Path Traversal in Picture/Movie Preview Endpoint</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-31978</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; motioneye-project motioneye&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for motion software, which is a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 are vulnerable to path traversal in the picture and movie API endpoints, suhc as /picture/{id}/preview/{filename}. Neither the API handlers, nor the mediafiles.py functions such as get_media_preview() check for .. sequences in the filename parameter, except for get_media_content(). This allows an authenticated user with normal (non-admin) privileges to read arbitrary files from the filesystem as the motionEye process user, such as:  /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, motionEye config files containing password hashes and plaintext passwords, SSH keys, and other cameras&amp;#39; surveillance footage. This issue has been fixed in version 0.44.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; motioneye-project motioneye&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;motionEye (mEye) is an online interface for motion software, which is a video surveillance program with motion detection. Versions prior to 0.44.0 are vulnerable to path traversal in the picture and movie API endpoints, suhc as /picture/{id}/preview/{filename}. Neither the API handlers, nor the mediafiles.py functions such as get_media_preview() check for .. sequences in the filename parameter, except for get_media_content(). This allows an authenticated user with normal (non-admin) privileges to read arbitrary files from the filesystem as the motionEye process user, such as:  /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, motionEye config files containing password hashes and plaintext passwords, SSH keys, and other cameras&amp;#39; surveillance footage. This issue has been fixed in version 0.44.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-31978</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
