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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 07 Oct 2026 11:01:25 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-12050 — pgAdmin 4: SQL injection in named restore point endpoint</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-12050</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; pgadmin.org pgAdmin 4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SQL injection in pgAdmin 4&amp;#39;s named restore point endpoint (POST /browser/server/restore_point/{gid}/{sid}). The user-supplied &amp;#39;value&amp;#39; field was interpolated directly into the SQL string with str.format() instead of being passed as a bound parameter, allowing an authenticated pgAdmin user with a connected PostgreSQL session to inject additional statements through that endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The injected SQL executes under the database role the user is already authenticated as. The defect does not cross a privilege boundary -- the user already has direct SQL access to that role through the Query Tool -- so the attacker gains no capability beyond what their database role already grants them. The marginal impact accounts for the fact that the injection path is not the documented SQL-execution interface, so a deployment that gates the Query Tool at the application layer could see SQL executed through a path it did not anticipate.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix passes the restore point name as a bound parameter and schema-qualifies the function call as pg_catalog.pg_create_restore_point so a non-default search_path on the connection cannot redirect the call to a shadow definition. A regression test asserts the value arrives as a bound parameter and not spliced into the SQL string.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 1.0 before 9.16.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; pgadmin.org pgAdmin 4&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;SQL injection in pgAdmin 4&amp;#39;s named restore point endpoint (POST /browser/server/restore_point/{gid}/{sid}). The user-supplied &amp;#39;value&amp;#39; field was interpolated directly into the SQL string with str.format() instead of being passed as a bound parameter, allowing an authenticated pgAdmin user with a connected PostgreSQL session to inject additional statements through that endpoint.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The injected SQL executes under the database role the user is already authenticated as. The defect does not cross a privilege boundary -- the user already has direct SQL access to that role through the Query Tool -- so the attacker gains no capability beyond what their database role already grants them. The marginal impact accounts for the fact that the injection path is not the documented SQL-execution interface, so a deployment that gates the Query Tool at the application layer could see SQL executed through a path it did not anticipate.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix passes the restore point name as a bound parameter and schema-qualifies the function call as pg_catalog.pg_create_restore_point so a non-default search_path on the connection cannot redirect the call to a shadow definition. A regression test asserts the value arrives as a bound parameter and not spliced into the SQL string.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 1.0 before 9.16.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-12050</guid>
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