https://cve.radiocsirt.org Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 07 Oct 2026 23:34:13 +0000 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-49293 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> sunnyadn js-toml</p> <p>js-toml is a TOML parser for JavaScript, fully compliant with the TOML 1.0.0 Spec. Versions up to and including 1.1.0 parse hexadecimal / octal / binary integer literals via a hand-written `parseBigInt` loop that multiplies a `BigInt` accumulator by the radix once per input digit. Each iteration performs a `BigInt * BigInt` operation on an accumulator that grows linearly with the number of digits already consumed, so the whole loop is O(n²) in the literal length. The lexer regex places no upper bound on the literal length, so a single TOML document containing one ~500 kB hex literal pins one CPU core for ~40 seconds on a modern laptop (Apple M-series, Node v22). Memory amplification is bounded but CPU amplification is severe and grows quadratically: doubling the literal length quadruples the work. A caller that invokes `load()` on attacker-controlled TOML (configuration upload endpoints, CI/CD systems ingesting third-party `*.toml`, IDE plugins, build tools) is exposed to a single-request CPU exhaustion DoS. Version 1.1.1 fixes the issue.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> sunnyadn js-toml</p> <p>js-toml is a TOML parser for JavaScript, fully compliant with the TOML 1.0.0 Spec. Versions up to and including 1.1.0 parse hexadecimal / octal / binary integer literals via a hand-written `parseBigInt` loop that multiplies a `BigInt` accumulator by the radix once per input digit. Each iteration performs a `BigInt * BigInt` operation on an accumulator that grows linearly with the number of digits already consumed, so the whole loop is O(n²) in the literal length. The lexer regex places no upper bound on the literal length, so a single TOML document containing one ~500 kB hex literal pins one CPU core for ~40 seconds on a modern laptop (Apple M-series, Node v22). Memory amplification is bounded but CPU amplification is severe and grows quadratically: doubling the literal length quadruples the work. A caller that invokes `load()` on attacker-controlled TOML (configuration upload endpoints, CI/CD systems ingesting third-party `*.toml`, IDE plugins, build tools) is exposed to a single-request CPU exhaustion DoS. Version 1.1.1 fixes the issue.</p> https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-49293