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    <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-49757 — OAuth2/OIDC account takeover in AshAuthentication via email-based user matching</title>
      <link>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-49757</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; team-alembic ash_authentication&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows account takeover of local users via OAuth2/OIDC sign-in.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AshAuthentication&amp;#39;s OAuth2 and OIDC family strategies matched the local user by email address (an upsert on the email field, or a user-defined sign-in filter) rather than by the OpenID Connect iss/sub claim combination. Per OpenID Connect Core §5.7, only iss/sub uniquely and stably identifies an end-user; other claims, including email, MUST NOT be used as unique identifiers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A provider login presenting a victim&amp;#39;s email, including an unverified email, a reused email, or an account with email_verified: false, resolved to and signed in as the victim&amp;#39;s existing local account. An unauthenticated attacker who can register an account on any accepted OAuth provider with the victim&amp;#39;s email (or who benefits from provider-side email reuse or reclamation) obtains the victim&amp;#39;s full local privileges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix resolves users by the (strategy, sub) identity stored in a user identity resource, and only links a new sub to an existing local account by email when the provider&amp;#39;s email_verified claim is trusted (trust_email_verified?).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash_authentication from 0.1.0 before 4.14.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.10.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; team-alembic ash_authentication&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows account takeover of local users via OAuth2/OIDC sign-in.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AshAuthentication&amp;#39;s OAuth2 and OIDC family strategies matched the local user by email address (an upsert on the email field, or a user-defined sign-in filter) rather than by the OpenID Connect iss/sub claim combination. Per OpenID Connect Core §5.7, only iss/sub uniquely and stably identifies an end-user; other claims, including email, MUST NOT be used as unique identifiers.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A provider login presenting a victim&amp;#39;s email, including an unverified email, a reused email, or an account with email_verified: false, resolved to and signed in as the victim&amp;#39;s existing local account. An unauthenticated attacker who can register an account on any accepted OAuth provider with the victim&amp;#39;s email (or who benefits from provider-side email reuse or reclamation) obtains the victim&amp;#39;s full local privileges.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix resolves users by the (strategy, sub) identity stored in a user identity resource, and only links a new sub to an existing local account by email when the provider&amp;#39;s email_verified claim is trusted (trust_email_verified?).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash_authentication from 0.1.0 before 4.14.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.10.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cve-2026-49757</guid>
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